Worcester v. Georgia: A Breakdown in the Separation of Powers by Sundquist, Matthew L.
American Indian Law Review
Volume 35 | Number 1
1-1-2010
Worcester v. Georgia: A Breakdown in the
Separation of Powers
Matthew L. Sundquist
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/ailr
Part of the Indian and Aboriginal Law Commons, Legal History Commons, President/Executive
Department Commons, Supreme Court of the United States Commons, and the United States
History Commons
This Special Feature is brought to you for free and open access by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in American Indian Law Review by an authorized editor of University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons. For more information,
please contact darinfox@ou.edu.
Recommended Citation
Matthew L. Sundquist, Worcester v. Georgia: A Breakdown in the Separation of Powers, 35 Am. Indian L. Rev. (2010),
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/ailr/vol35/iss1/14
WORCESTER V. GEORGIA: A BREAKDOWN IN THE
SEPARATION OF POWERS
Matthew L. Sundquist*
I. Introduction
Thomas Jefferson believed that government could destroy liberty by
"generalizing [and] concentrating all cares and powers into one body."' The
founders thus balanced power between three branches of government owing
obligations to one another.2 The legislative branch writes laws and ratifies
treaties,' the judicial branch interprets laws,4 and the executive branch directs
the government and enforces laws.5  In this article, I examine the
circumstances surrounding Worcester v. Georgia, noting that each branch
failed to uphold this balance-of-power framework: the President by ignoring
a Supreme Court decision, the Senate by ratifying an illegitimate treaty, and
the Supreme Court by failing to take steps to enforce a decision. The
subsequent breakdown in governance reduced confidence in government and
had dire consequences for the Cherokee Nation.'
* Matthew Sundquist is a Fulbirght scholar in Argentina, and a teaching assistant at the
University of San Juan. He is a graduate of Harvard College. Correspondence should be
directed to matt.sundquist@gmail.com. I am grateful to Erika Tokar for her helpful suggestions
and to the editors of the American Indian Law Review for their assistance.
1. Roy J. HONEYWELL, THE EDUCATIONAL WORK OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 229 (Russell
& Russell 1964) (1931).
2. See John A. Fairlie, The Separation of Powers, 21 MICH. L. REv. 393, 393 (1923)
("This tripartite system of governmental authorities was the result of a combination ofhistorical
experience and a political theory generally accepted in this country as a fundamental maxim in
the latter part of the eighteenth century.").
3. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (noting that two-thirds of the Senate must ratify a treaty).
4. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1 ("The judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in
one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain
and establish.").
5. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 1 ("The executive Power shall be vested in a President of
the United States of America."); U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 7 (noting that the President must
swear to "preserve, protect and defend the Constitution of the United States"); see also Kendall
v. United States, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 524, 613 (1838) ("To contend that the obligation imposed
on the President to see the laws faithfully executed, implies a power to forbid their execution;
is a novel construction of the [C]onstitution, and is entirely inadmissible.").
6. 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832).
7. See generally James R. Kerr, Constitutional Rights, Tribal Justice, and the American
239
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Part II of this article describes the circumstances and events leading up to
Worcester v. Georgia. Part III discusses the Court's decision and describes
how the Court, Georgia, President Andrew Jackson, and the Cherokee Nation
subsequently reacted. Part IV analyzes the ways in which each branch of
government neglected its respective constitutional obligations.
II. Case Background
In 1830, Georgia asserted sovereignty over lands occupied by Cherokees by
passing a law requiring whites living on Cherokee lands to acquire a license
and take an oath to support and defend Georgia's constitution.8 Two
missionaries, Samuel Worcester and Dr. Elizur Butler, opposed Georgia's
claim and did not seek a license.' They were arrested and sentenced to four
years of hard labor, but appealed to the Supreme Court. o The Court granted
certiorari." The narrow question before the Court was whether the
missionaries committed a crime by failing to acquire a license.12 The broader
questions were whether Georgia law applied to Cherokee lands and whether
the Cherokee Nation had sovereignty over its lands."
Indian, 18 J. PUB. L. 311, 311-12 (1969) ("Both Congress and the U.S. Supreme Court have
played leading roles in contributing to the labyrinth of the constitutional status of the tribal
Indian."); Torsten Persson et al., Separation ofPowers and Political Accountability, 112 Q.J.
ECON. 1163, 1163 (1997) ("Political constitutions are incomplete contracts and therefore leave
room for abuse of power.").
8. Edwin A. Miles, After John Marshall's Decision: Worcester v. Georgia and the
Nullification Crisis, 39 J. S. HIST. 519, 521 (1973); see also Joseph C. Burke, The Cherokee
Cases: A Study in Law, Politics, andMorality, 21 STAN. L. REV. 500,503 (1969). For a history
of the Cherokee Nation, see HENRY THOMPSON MALONE, CHEROKEES OF THE OLD SouTH: A
PEOPLE IN TRANSITION (1956). For a history of Cherokee removal, see LouIs FILLER & ALLEN
GUTrMANN, THE REMOVAL OF THE CHEROKEE NATION: MANIFEST DESTINY OR NATIONAL
DISHONOR? (1962); Wilcomb E. Washburn, Indian Removal Policy: Administrative, Historical
and Moral Criteria for Judging Its Success or Failure, 12 ETHNOHISTORY 274 (1965).
9. See Miles, supra note 8, at 521.
10. See id. at 519.
11. See JILL NORGREN, THE CHEROKEE CASES: Two LANDMARK FEDERAL DECISIONS IN
THE FIGHT FOR SOVEREIGNTY 114 (2004) ("The Supreme Court agreed to hear the Worcester-
Butler appeal in the winter of 1832.").
12. Id. at 114-15 ("Technically, the issue in the case, now titled Worcester v. Georgia, was
whether the missionaries had been arrested, tried, and sentenced under a state law that violated
the U.S. Constitution's commerce clause... . The appeal also asked the Court to rule whether
the Cherokee Republic constituted a sovereign nation that was recognized by treaties with the
United States and over which a state of the United States could have no jurisdiction.").
13. Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 521 (1832) ("The legislative power of a
state, the controlling power of the constitution and laws of the United States, the rights, if they
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Both sides were supported by powerful political, legal, and cultural forces.
Georgia had a powerful ally in President Andrew Jackson, who made his
political fortunes leading expansion,14 and "spent most of his life fighting on
behalf of his country against Native Americans and foreign powers."' 5 In his
view, expanding American territory was "extending the area of freedom.""
He commanded United States military forces in numerous battles against the
tribes, and led negotiations in nine of the eleven treaties between the southern
tribes and the United States." Jackson signed the controversial Indian
Removal Act," in many ways staking his administration on it.'9 The Senate
passed the bill on April 24, 1830; the House passed it on May 26, 1830.20 in
theory, the Act was designed to authorize the federal government to negotiate
removal treaties. In practice, the government invoked the Act to justify
exerting pressure on the tribes.2'
Moreover, although the United States increased its holdings by signing a
variety of treaties, 22 such as the Transcontinental Treaty in 1819,23 Jackson's
have any, the political existence of a once numerous and powerful people, the personal liberty
of a citizen, are all involved in the subject now to be considered.").
14. See B. Donald Grose, Edwin Forrest, Metamora, and the Indian Removal Act of 1830,
37 THEATRE J. 181, 181 (1985) ("On the issues of westward expansion and Indian removal,
Jackson forged a political career.").
15. Gerard N. Magliocca, Preemptive Opinions: The Secret History of Worcester v.
Georgia and Dred Scott, 63 U. PITT. L. REV. 487, 514 (2002).
16. JOHN WILLIAM WARD, ANDREW JACKSON: SYMBOL FOR AN AGE 136 (1955).
17. Indian Removal, PBS ONLINE, http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/aia/part4/4p2959.html (last
visited May 8, 2010).
18. Ch. 148, 4 Stat. 411 (1830).
19. ROBERT V. REMINI, ANDREW JACKSON AND His INDIAN WARS 236 (2001) [hereinafter
REMINI, JACKSON].
20. FRANCIs PAUL PRUCHA, THE GREAT FATHER: THE UNITED STATEs GOVERNMENT AND
THE AMERICAN INDIANS 75 (abr. 1986).
21. See ALAN AXELROD & CHARLES PHILLIPS, WHAT EVERY AMERICAN SHOULD KNow
ABOUT AMERICAN HISTORY: 225 EVENTs THAT SHAPED THE NATION 93 (3d ed. 2008) ("In the
face of Indian resistance, Jackson's government, both officially and unofficially, administered
the removal policy ruthlessly and in bad faith.").
22. See Michelle Smith & Janet C. Newman, Keeping Indian Claims Commission Decisions
in Their Place: Assessing the Preclusive Effect of ICC Decisions in Litigation Over
Off-Reservation Treaty Fishing Rights, 31 U. HAW. L. REv. 475, 486 (2009) ("Treaties signed
between the United States and tribes usually had one main theme: tribes 'relinquished land to
the United States' in exchange for certain promises. The purpose of these treaties was to
confine tribes to delineated land reservations, thereby opening up more land for white
settlers.").
23. The United States acquired Florida through this treaty. MEG GREENE, THE
TRANSCONTINENTAL TREATY, 1819: A PRIMARY SOURCE EXAMINATION OF THE TREATY
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election marked the realization of a more coordinated and centralized Indian
removal initiative.24 Neighboring territories had steadily added formerly
Indian territory to their own,25 and Georgia was eager to capitalize on the
momentum and to access gold on Cherokee lands.26
The Cherokee's claim was also at odds with manifest destiny. Beginning
with the American Revolution, the quasi-religious movement lasted roughly
until the Civil War.2 ' Adherents believed in America's virtue and felt a God-
given duty to spread American institutions." As John Quincy Adams
explained, America could claim the entire continent.
North America appears to be destined by Divine Providence to be
peopled by one nation, speaking one language, professing one
general system of religious and political principles, and accustomed
to one general tenor of social usages and customs. For the common
BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND SPAIN OVER THE AMERICAN WEST 5 (2006).
24. See GRANT FOREMAN, INDIAN REMOVAL: THE EMIGRATION OF THE FIVE CIVILIZED
TRIBESOFINDIANS 13 (1985) ("Indian removal, operated for some years in a haphazard manner,
became established as a national policy with the election as president of its most powerful
exponent, Gen. Andrew Jackson."); see also WARD, supra note 16, at 133-50; Robert M.
Owens, Jeffersonian Benevolence on the Ground: The Indian Land Cession Treaties of William
Henry Harrison, 22 J. EARLY REPUBLIC 405, 405 (2002) ("Justice, however, always proved
secondary to the desire for America's constantly expanding 'Empire for Liberty."'). See
generally LLOYD C. GARDNER ET AL., CREATION OF THE AMERICAN EMPIRE: U.S. DIPLOMATIC
HISTORY 139 (1973) (discussing "this wave of imperialism" and noting that "it was the
consequence of a deliberate foreign policy that used calculated means to achieve specific,
concrete ends").
25. ADAM ROTHMAN, SLAVE COUNTRY: AMERICAN EXPANSION AND THE ORIGINS OF THE
DEEP SOUTH 168 (2005) ("The United States acquired vast amounts of Indian land in the five
years after the defeat of the Red Sticks [in 1814], establishing in the process the pattern for
Indian removal west of the Mississippi.").
26. Magliocca, supra note 15, at 522.
27. See RODNEY P. CARLISLE, MANIFEST DESTINY AND THE EXPANSION OF AMERICA XVii
(2007) ("In the first sixty years of the nineteenth century, the United States expanded from its
original boundaries between the Atlantic coast and the Mississippi River.... Borrowing a
phrase from journalists, politicians asserted that the expansion of the United States was the
fulfillment of its 'Manifest Destiny."'); REGINALD STUART, UNITED STATES EXPANSIONISM AND
BRITISH NORTH AMERICA, 1775-1871, at 255 (1988) ("Manifest Destiny has been used most
often to characterize the whole of America's nineteenth-century expansionism."); JESSE
JARNOw & J. T. MORIARTY, MANIFEST DESTINY: A PRIMARY SOURCE HISTORY OF AMERICA'S
TERRITORIAL EXPANSION IN THE 19TH CENTURY 4 (2005) (discussing United States expansion
from 1787 onwards and noting that "[m]ost of this territorial expansion occurred during the
nineteenth century under the doctrine of Manifest Destiny").
28. WILLIAM E. WEEKS, BUILDING THE CONTINENTAL EMPIRE: AMERICAN EXPANSION
FROM THE REVOLUTION TO THE CIVIL WAR 61 (1996).
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happiness of them all, for their peace and prosperity, I believe it is
indispensable that they should be associated in one federal Union.29
Worcester and the Cherokee Nation also had allies and enjoyed a degree of
public support." Notably, Daniel Webster, who moved "from debating
political issues in the Senate to arguing in the Supreme Court,"3' and Henry
Clay, the former Secretary of State known as the "Great Compromiser,"3 2 both
supported the Cherokee Nation,33 as did Davy Crockett, a cultural icon and
Congressman.34 Webster advised the Cherokee delegation to hire William
Wirt as counsel. Serving as Attorney General under presidents Monroe and
Adams, Wirt argued a total 174 Supreme Court cases,36 including McCulloch
v. Maryland," Gibbons v. Ogden,38 and Cherokee Nation v. Georgia.
Because Georgia refused to recognize the Court's authority and boycotted oral
arguments, Wirt and his co-counsel, John Sergeant, would not argue against
opposing counsel.40
29. WALTER A. MCDOUGALL, PROMISED LAND, CRUSADER STATE: THE AMERICAN
ENCOUNTER WITH THE WORLD SINCE 1776, at 78 (1997).
30. See Magliocca, supra note 15, at 523-24.
31. John G. Roberts, Jr., 2008 Dwight D. Opperman Lecture at Drake University Law
School (Oct. 2, 2008), 57 DRAKE L. REv. 1, 5 (2008).
32. See e.g., HOWARD WALTER CALDWELL ET AL., HENRY CLAY, THE GREAT
COMPROMISER (1903).
33. R. KENT NEWMYER, JOHN MARSHALL AND THE HEROIC AGE OF THE SUPREME COURT
446 (2007) ("Supporting Wirt and Sergeant informally with legal advice and moral support
were Webster, Henry Clay, and the great legal scholar James Kent.").
34. DAVID BURNER ET AL., FIRSTHAND AMERICA: A HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 277
(3d ed. 1994) ("Georgia ignored the Court's ruling on the Cherokee case as well as the
opposition of such powerful senators as Henry Clay and Daniel Webster and such congressman
as the frontiersman Davy Crockett.").
35. THOMAS HART BENTON, THIRTY YEARS' VIEW; OR, A HISTORY OF THE WORKING OF
THE AMERICAN GOVERNMENT FOR THIRTY YEARS, FROM 1820 TO 1850, at 164-65 (1885);
Burke, supra note 8, at 508.
36. Robert Aitken & Marilyn Aitken, The Life and Death of George Wythe: "I Am
Murdered", 31 LITIGATION 53, 64 (2005).
37. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
38. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
39. 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831); see 4 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE AMERICAN PRESIDENCY 1657
(Leonard W. Levy & Louis Fisher eds., 1994) ("Wirt argued a number of important cases.. .
[including] McCulloch v. Maryland (1819) and Gibbons v. Ogden (1824)."); I ROBERT J.
CONLEY, A CHEROKEE ENCYCLOPEDIA 265 (1996) ("In the case of Cherokee Nation v. Georgia,
Wirt argued that the Cherokee Nation was a foreign nation and could not therefore be subject
to the laws of Georgia.").
40. See Burke, supra note 8, at 521.
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There were reasons to believe the Court might side with Worcester.
Congress has the authority "[t]o regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and
among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes,"' yet it was unclear
whether the tribes were a state, nation, or other unique entity. Also unclear
was whether the Constitution conferred rights on the tribes. The Court
partially clarified these issues, in a manner that seemed to favor Worcester, in
Cherokee Nation v. Georgia. The Court, in an opinion penned by Chief
Justice John Marshall, ruled that although the Cherokee Nation's sovereignty
was necessarily diminished by its reliance on the United States, the tribe was
a "denominated domestic dependent nation[]."' In addition to authoring the
Cherokee Nation opinion, Marshall had voiced support for the Cherokee
Nation in his correspondence. Marshall wrote,
I have followed the debate in both houses of Congress . . .and have
wished, most sincerely, that both the Executive and Legislative
departments had thought differently on the subject. Humanity must
bewail the course which is pursued, whatever may be the decision
of policy.43
The Cherokee Nation assimilated with settlers for expediency, to convince
observers that it could own and manage its lands, and to assuage criticisms that
its members were incapable of leading civilized lives." The Nation built toll-
roads and ferries,45 used large-scale farming and an alphabet, stopped hunting
and fishing,46 and owned slaves.47 With the help of Samuel Worcester, the
tribe published a newspaper, the Cherokee Phoenix.48 By 1830, the Nation
41. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
42. Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) at 13.
43. Burke, supra note 8, at 510.
44. JAY P. KINNEY, A CONTINENT LOST, A CIVILIZATION WON: INDIAN LAND TENURE IN
AMERICA 54 (1975).
45. TIM ALAN GARRISON, THE LEGAL IDEOLOGY OF REMOVAL: THE SOUTHERN JUDICIARY
AND THE SOVEREIGNTY OF NATIVE AMERICAN NATIONS 236 (2002).
46. Stephen J. Breyer, Dwight D. Opperman Lecture: Reflections of a Junior Justice, 54
DRAKE L. REV. 7, 8 (2005) ("Now, this tribe had given up hunting and fishing for better or for
worse. They were farmers, they had an alphabet.").
47. RENNARD STRICKLAND, FIRE AND THE SPIRITS: CHEROKEE LAW FROM CLAN TO COURT
79(1975).
48. See Miles, supra note 8, at 520.
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was producing surplus food.49 Moreover, to strengthen its legal standing,"o the
Cherokee Nation wrote a constitution, modeled after the United States'
Constitution, that drew territorial boundaries and created a General Council
and judicial system."
III. The Result and Response
How the involved parties viewed the importance of the Worcester opinion
explains their reactions. The Cherokees were prepared to accept the decision,
trusting the Court as an institution.5 2 Elias Boudinot, editor of the Cherokee
Phoenix, editorialized, "We will merely say that if the highest judicial tribunal
in the land will not sustain our rights and treaties we will give up and quit our
murmurings." Georgia Governor George Gilmer described the Cherokees'
views in a letter to Jackson. Gilmer wrote, "[T]heir chiefs have used these
[Supreme Court] opinions to convince them that their rights of self-
government and soil were independent of the United States and Georgia, and
would be secured to them through the Supreme Court."5 4 By contrast, some
thought Georgia intended to ignore the ruling as it had ignored oral
arguments" and past orders," and Whig newspapers suggested that Jackson
49. David M. Wishart, Evidence of Surplus Production in the Cherokee Nation Prior to
Removal, 55 J. EcON. HIST. 120, 120 (1995) ("[A] majority of Cherokee households produced
surplus food before removal.").
50. DAVID EUGENE WILKINS, DOCUMENTS OF NATIVE AMERICAN POLITICAL
DEVELOPMENT: 1500S TO 1933, at 57 (2009) ("[T]he adoption of a secular national
constitutional [] effectively supplanted the traditional Cherokee political system, which was
based on clan structures, decentralized towns, and oral traditions. The constitution
demonstrated the Cherokee's adaptive power and desire to resist the threats posed by local,
state, and federal policymakers.").
51. The government was active. From 1808-1835, the counselors passed two hundred
resolutions and 246 cases were brought to court. STRICKLAND, supra note 47, at 74.
52. See id. at 78 ("The 'rhetoric of reform' which the Cherokees formulated during the
transformation of their legal system uniformly identified adoption of white-based laws with
resistance of removal from ancient tribal lands. Supreme faith was placed in the operation of
courts of justice.").
53. Id. (quoting Elias Boudinot, Editorial, CHEROKEE PHOENIX, Jul. 3, 1830).
54. Id. (quoting CHEROKEE ADVOCATE, Oct. 22, 1831).
55. See 2 JOHN P. KENNEDY, MEMOIRS OF THE LIFE OF WILLIAM WIRT, ATTORNEY-
GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES 291 (1850).
56. See NEWMYER, supra note 33, at 447 ("Georgia in fact let the Court know exactly what
it might expect when the state executed a Cherokee by the name of Corn Tassel in December
1830 in direct defiance of a writ of habeas corpus issued by the Supreme Court and signed
personally by Marshall.").
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had threatened to ignore the ruling."
Marshall's majority opinion addressed "the political existence of a once
numerous and powerful people,"" and whether Georgia had the authority to
regulate the intercourse between citizens of its state and members of the
Cherokee Nation.59 The opinion had three important findings. First, the Court
cleared Worcester of criminal charges, nullifying the lower court judgment.60
Second, the Court declared Georgia's law unconstitutional, deeming "[t]he
acts of Georgia [] repugnant to the constitution, laws, and treaties of the United
States."" Third, the Court declared the Cherokee Nation "a distinct
community occupying its own territory. . . in which the laws of Georgia can
have no force" and where "the citizens of Georgia have no right to enter."62
The Court then adjourned, opting not to order federal marshalls to enforce the
decision.63
In response, Georgia declared that any individual who came to enforce the
ruling would be hanged,' and Jackson stated, "The decision of the Supreme
Court has fell still born ... and they find that it cannot coerce Georgia to yield
to its mandate."6' Benjamin Butler, Jackson's future Attorney General, argued
57. See Anton-Hermann Chroust, Did President Jackson Actually Threaten the Supreme
Court ofthe United States with Nonenforcement oflts Injunction Against the State ofGeorgia?,
4 AM. J. LEG. HIST. 76, 76 (1960).
58. Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 521 (1832).
59. Id. at 540.
60. Id. at 561 ("The act of the state of Georgia, under which the plaintiff in error was
prosecuted, is consequently void, and the judgment a nullity.").
61. Id. Marshall's opinion invoked language quite similar to the Judiciary Act of 1789,
which states, "[W]here is drawn in question the validity of a statute of, or an authority exercised
under any State, on the ground of their being repugnant to the constitution, treaties or laws of
the United States,.. . [the] Constitution, treaty, statute or commission, may be re-examined and
reversed or affirmed in the Supreme Court of the United States." Act of Sept. 24, 1789, ch. 20,
§ 25, 1 Stat. 73, 85-86. See generally HERBERT A. JOHNSON, THE CHIEF JUSTICESHIP OF JOHN
MARSHALL, 1801-1835, 149-57 (1997); Charles Warren, Legislative and Judicial Attacks on
the Supreme Court of the United States--A History of the Twenty-Fifth Section of the Judiciary
Act, 47 AM. L. REV. 1 (1913).
62. Worcester, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) at 561.
63. Ronald A. Berutti, Note, The Cherokee Cases: The Fight to Save the Supreme Court
and the Cherokee Indians, 17 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 291, 305 (1992).
64. See Breyer, supra note 46, at 9 ("The first thing the Georgia legislature did was pass
a law that said anyone who comes to Georgia to enforce this ruling of the Supreme Court will
be hanged.").
65. PAUL F. BOLLER & JOHN GEORGE, THEY NEVER SAID IT: A BOOK OF FALSE QUOTES,
MISQUOTES, & FALSE ArrRIBUTIONS 53 (1989) (noting that this statement is an accurate
attribution, although he is often quoted as having said "John Marshall has made his decision;
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that because the Court did not issue a remedial order mandating enforcement,
Jackson had no grounds to interfere." Ten months after the decision, the
missionaries were released" after accepting a pardon that required Worcester
not to work with the Cherokee Nation (though he likely returned)."
The Cherokees continued to be removed, and Chief John Ross, appointed
in 1834 to head negotiations, knew that the Nation was losing bargaining
power as its numbers depleted." When negotiations dragged on, a subset of
the Nation began side negotiations on a separate treaty, the Treaty of New
Echota. This treaty received 114 votes, at most, out of thousands of votes at
the National Council.70 It was ratified by a subset of the Treaty Party, and
forwarded to the Senate," where Webster and Clay lobbied against it, pointing
out that it was not legitimately endorsed by the Nation.72 The Senate ratified
the Treaty of New Echota by one vote. 3  The Treaty stipulated that the
Cherokees be awarded five million dollars and move to Oklahoma within two
years.74 By 1838, about two thousand Cherokees had migrated, and at least
now let him enforce it!").
66. Burke, supra note 8, at 527.
67. See Miles, supra note 8, at 519.
68. Id. at 531.
69. See Cherokee in Georgia: Treaty of New Echota, ABOUT NORTH GEORGIA, http://
ngeorgia.com/history/cherokeehistory7.html (last visited May 9, 2010).
70. See DONALD B. COLE, THE PRESIDENCY OF ANDREW JACKSON 116 (1993). Others cite
different numbers. E.g., GARRISON, supra note 45, at 231 ("Though only seventy-five
Cherokees out of a population of over sixteen thousand had approved the treaty.").
71. See REMINI, JACKSON, supra note 19, at 267-68.
72. Clay introduced the following Senate resolution:
That the instrument of writing, purporting to be a treaty concluded at New Echota
on the 29th of December, 1835, between the United States and the chiefs, head
men and people of the Cherokee tribe . . . were not made and concluded by
authority, on the part of the Cherokee tribe, competent to bind it; and, therefore,
... the Senate cannot consent to and advise the ratification thereof, as a valid
treaty.
BENTON, supra note 35, at 625.
73. Id.
74. Treaty of New Echota pmbl., U.S.-Cherokee, Dec. 29, 1835, 7 Stat. 478, reprinted in
2 INDIAN AFFAIRS: LAWS AND TREATIES 439, 439 (Charles J. Kappler ed., 1904) [hereinafter
KAPPLER].
The Cherokee nation hereby cede relinquish and convey to the United States all
the lands owned claimed or possessed by them east of the Mississippi river, and
hereby release all their claims upon the United States for spoliations of every kind
for and in consideration of the sum of five millions of dollars to be expended paid
and invested in the manner stipulated and agreed upon in the following articles.
Id. art. 1, reprinted in KAPPLER, supra, at 440. "It is hereby stipulated and agreed by the
No. 1] 247
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sixteen thousand remained." United States soldiers began to forcibly remove
those who remained." During the journey - called Nunna daul Tsuny in the
Cherokee language, or "the trail where they cried"" - at least four thousand
Cherokees died, and possibly twice that number.
Not everyone approved of the government's actions. Davy Crockett
resigned from Congress, saying, "I would sooner be honestly and politically
damned, than hypocritically immortalized,"" and Ralph Waldo Emerson
captured the sentiments of those who opposed the government in a letter to
President Martin Van Buren. Emerson wrote,
I write thus, sir, to inform you of the state of mind these Indian
tidings have awakened here, and to pray with one voice more that
you, whose hands are strong with the delegated power of fifteen
millions of men, will avert with that might the terrific injury which
threatens the Cherokee tribe.80
The relocation resulted in a "calamity of unparalleled proportions for the
Cherokee psyche."" The Cherokees never fully recovered from the relocation,
as they were forced to abandon plans for established political and diplomatic
arrangements, a well-integrated economy, and a national academy for youth.82
Had the Senate, Court, or President embraced its constitutional role, perhaps
this tragic incident would have turned out differently.
IV Resisting Encroachment
The framers created a system that, used properly, was capable of preserving
Cherokees that they shall remove to their new homes within two years from the ratification of
this treaty." Id. art. 16, reprinted in KAPPLER, supra, at 446; see also MARK STEWART, THE
INDIAN REMOVAL ACT: FORCED RELOCATION 10 (2007) ("Not until late October 1838 did the
long journey westward begin.").
75. See GARRISON, supra note 45, at 231.
76. GEORGE WUERTHNER, GREAT SMOKY MOUNTAINS: A VISITOR'S COMPANION 30 (2003)
("In 1838, the army gathered up between 16,000 and 20,000 Cherokee at gunpoint and forced
them to march from the Appalachian to the Oklahoma Territory.").
77. JAMES WALLER, PREJUDICE ACROSS AMERICA 205 (2000).
78. See 3 ROBERT V. REMINI, ANDREW JACKSON AND THE COURSE OF AMERICAN
DEMOCRACY, 1833-1835, at 302-03 (1984) [hereinafter REMINI, DEMOCRACY].
79. ROBERT J. CONLEY, THE CHEROKEE NATION: A HISTORY 134 (2005).
80. SAUL K. PADOVER, SOURCES OF DEMOCRACY: VOICES OF FREEDOM, HOPE AND JUSTICE
268 (1973).
81. GARRISON, supra note 45, at 234.
82. Id. at 234-36.
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the balance of power. To prevent a "gradual concentration" of power in one
branch, they gave "those who administer each department the necessary
constitutional means and personal motives to resist encroachments of the
others."83 Citizens can hold leaders accountable and "determine on whom the
blame or the punishment of a pernicious measure, or series of pernicious
measures, ought really to fall."" In the Worcester case, blame for the
breakdown in the balance of power and the resulting tragedy should be shared.
Jackson did not fulfill the executive branch's constitutional duties by seeing
that the law was fulfilled.85  The Senate and Court - each dependent on
presidential direction in many matters, while "able to resist presidential
direction in others" 6 - also failed to protect the rule of law."
The President is required to "take [c]are that the [l]aws be faithfully
executed."8 8 The President may require the opinions of principal officers on
the exercise of their duties. 9 Nevertheless, the President is not charged with
interpreting or creating law,90 as legislative power is delegated to Congress,91
83. THE FEDERALISTNO. 51, at 286 (Alexander Hamilton) (E.H. Scott ed., 1898).
84. THE FEDERALIST NO. 70, at 388 (Alexander Hamilton) (E.H. Scott ed., 1898).
85. See GARRISON, supra note 45, at 238 ("Andrew Jackson disagreed vehemently with the
Worcester decision, for he sought to end the federal practice of recognizing the tribes as
sovereign nations. For this reason, and since it was politically unwise to ignore southern
demands at the same time he was putting down the South Carolina nullification movement, he
chose not to impose Worcester on Georgia."); see also ROBERT EWING CORLEW ET AL.,
TENNESSEE: A SHORT HISTORY 153 (1990) ("Jackson, however, refused to enforce the decision
and permitted Georgia to continue to exercise its unconstitutional authority.").
86. Peter Strauss, The Place ofAgencies in Government: Separation of Powers and the
Fourth Branch, 84 COLUM. L. REv. 573, 583 (1984).
87. See GARRISON, supra note 45, at 237 ("Congress abided by Jackson's wishes, passed
the Indian Removal Act of 1830, and ratified the illegitimate treaties, like New Echota, signed
under the president's authority.").
88. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3; see also Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 693 (1988) (noting
that the President has both the authority and a "constitutional obligation to ensure the faithful
execution of the laws").
89. The President "may require the Opinion, in writing, of the principal Officer in each of
the executive Departments, upon any subject relating to the Duties of their respective Offices."
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1.
90. See Peter Strauss, Overseer, or "The Decider"? The President in Administrative Law,
75 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 696, 703 (2007) ("From this perspective, as some (but not all)
Attorneys General have concluded, when Congress creates duties in others, that act creates in
the President constitutional obligations not only to oversee but also to respect their independent
exercise of those duties.").
91. Congress has the authority to "make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for
carrying into Execution .. . all other Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of
the United States, or in any Department or Officer thereof." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18.
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and judicial power to the judicial branch.92 Purportedly based on these
principles, Benjamin Butler claimed that Jackson lacked legislative authority
to interfere in Georgia and should refrain from doing so.93 Butler claimed that
the Court's decision, though invoking support for the Cherokee Nation, did not
enumerate specific judgments beyond overturning the Georgia law.' Both
claims, especially after passage of the Force Act,95 are dubious. First, just two
days after Worcester's and Butler's release," when North Carolina invoked
nullification to justify not paying customs duties,97 Jackson ensured that the
law would be faithfully executed. He threatened to use military force," and
made a request to Congress to pass the Force Act to allow him to use coercive
means to enforce the law.99 He took no similar steps to enforce Worcester,
even after the Bill was passed. Second, the Court's decision did enumerate
specific principles: it specified that treaties between the federal government
and Cherokee Nation were valid, as was the stipulation that the United
States "restrain their citizens from trespassing" on Cherokee land.'o Georgia,
concluded the Court, had violated these pledges.'0 ' Jackson could have, and
should have, enforced the decision by enforcing treaties and protecting
Cherokee land, as federal troops did in North Carolina and Tennessee.'0 2 To
92. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1; see also Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S.
579, 587 (1952) (Black, J.) (arguing that "the President's power to see that the laws are
faithfully executed refutes the idea that he is to be a lawmaker").
93. For a discussion of this speech and Butler's reasoning, see Burke, supra note 8, at 527
("A long speech on October 8, 1832, by Benjamin Butler, later Jackson's Attorney General,
indicates that he too was aware of the procedural problems attending the Worcester case and
the importance of the Indian question in the campaign of 1832. Butler attempted to answer the
charge that Jackson had violated the Constitution by refusing to enforce the Worcester
decree.").
94. Id.
95. Act of Mar. 2, 1833, ch. 57, 4 Stat. 632 (authorizing Supreme Court Justices to issue
writs of habeas corpus to state courts).
96. Miles, supra note 8, at 541.
97. See Breyer, supra note 46, at 9.
98. 1 MICHAEL KAZIN ET AL., THE PRINCETON ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN POLITICAL
HISTORY 437 (2010) ("Jackson threatened military action to restore federal supremacy, arguing
that the state's actions were an intolerable rejection of majority rule.").
99. Miles, supra note 8, at 541.
100. Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 561-62 (1832) ("[T]he acts of Georgia..
interfere forcibly with the relations established between the United States and the Cherokee
nation... . They are in direct hostility with treaties.").
101. Id.
102. See Alfred A. Cave, Abuse ofPower: Andrew Jackson and the Indian Removal Act of
1830, 65 HISTORIAN 1330, 1330 (2003) ("While virtually all historical accounts of the Jackson
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legitimately oppose the decision, he could have called for legislation,103
authored executive policies," or mobilized interest groups.'0o
The Senate should have rejected the Treaty.'06 Instead, Jackson's supporters
held a super-majority0 ' and ratified the Treaty despite the minority's claim
that the Treaty was as "fraud," enforced through government power.os John
Ross, the duly appointed head of the Cherokee National Council, vehemently
opposed the Treaty, calling it a "false paper," and a "forgery ... by a knot of
unauthorized individuals."' 09 He delivered to the Senate a petition signed by
era, both scholarly and popular, devote some space to the relocation of Indian inhabitants' of
the eastern United States to an Indian territory west of the Mississippi, very few acknowledge
that the process as it was carried out by the Jackson administration violated guarantees
contained in the congressional legislation which authorized removal."); see also STRICKLAND,
supra note 46, at 5 ("The election of Andrew Jackson to the presidency, passage of the Indian
Removal Bill, and extension of Georgia law over the Cherokee Nation climaxed the Cherokee
crisis."). See generally Rennard Strickland & William Strickland, A Tale of Two Marshalls:
Reflections on Indian Law and Policy, the Cherokee Cases, and the Cruel Irony of Supreme
Court Victories, 47 OKLA. L. REv. I 11(1994).
103. In reaction toLedbetter v. Goodyear Tire& Rubber Co., 550 U.S. 618 (2007), President
Barack Obama signed the Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009, to "restore the law to where it
was before the Supreme Court's decision." Macon Phillips, Now Comes Lilly Ledbetter, THE
WHITE HOUSE BLOG, (Jan. 25, 2009, 1:48 PM), http://www.whitehouse.gov/now-comes-lilly-
ledbetter.
104. See generally Terry Moe & William G. Howell, The Presidential Power of Unitary
Action, 15 J. L. ECON. & ORG. 132 passim (1999).
105. See, e.g., Mark A. Peterson, The Presidency and Organized Interests: White House
Patterns ofInterest Group Liaison, 86 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 612, 615 (1992).
106. The President is invested with the "[p]ower, by and with the Advice and Consent ofthe
Senate, to make Treaties, provided two thirds of the Senators present concur." U.S. CONST. art.
II, § 2, cl. 2. Rejecting the treaty would not have been without precedent, as the Senate had
previously rejected treaties negotiated by the Executive. See generally JON ALLAN REYHNER,
TEACHING AMERICAN INDIAN STUDENTS 37 (1992) ("From the first treaty in 1788 till 1871,
when treaty making with Indian tribes was ended, the United States entered into almost 400
treaties."). For the history and role of the Senate in treaty ratification, see Michael J. Glennon,
The Senate Role in Treaty Ratification, 77 AM. J. INT'LL. 257 (1983); Richard E. Webb, Treaty-
Making and the President's Obligation to Seek the Advice and Consent of the Senate with
Special Reference to the Vietnam Peace Negotiations, 31 OHIO ST. L.J. 490 (1970).
107. Magliocca, supra note 15, at 552.
108. See id. (quoting 12 REG. DEB. 4565 (1836) (statement of Rep. Calhoun) ("[Jackson's
protestors] did not regard this as a treaty at all, and would not vote this appropriation under any
consideration. Should it be said that the Government, because it had the power, should force this
fraud upon the Cherokee nation?")).
109. SEAN MICHAEL O'BRIEN, IN BITTERNESS AND IN TEARS: ANDREW JACKSON'S
DESTRUCTION OF THE CREEKS AND SEMINOLES 233 (2003).
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sixteen thousand Cherokees who opposed the Treaty,"o which contrasted
sharply with the vote on the Treaty that received at most 114 votes out of
thousands."' Nonetheless, the Senate ignored that it was an illegitimate treaty
and allowed negotiators to abuse the rift in the Cherokee leadership,"12
allowing removal to continue. The Senate ought to have demanded a
legitimately ratified treaty, based on principles President Washington
articulately explained. Washington said,
It is said to be the general understanding and practice of nations, as
a check on the mistakes and indiscretions of ministers or
commissioners, not to consider any treaty negotiated and signed by
such officers, as final and conclusive until ratified by the sovereign
or government from whom they derive their powers. This practice
has been adopted by the United States respecting their treaties with
European nations, and I am inclined to think it would be advisable
to observe it in the conduct of our treaties with the Indians."'
To understand why the Court bears responsibility, we can contrast
Worcester with Cooper v. Aaron,114 a decision released to enforce Brown v.
Board of Education. 5 In Cooper, the Court took a firm stance against
nullification. The opinion explained that "[n]o state legislator or executive or
judicial officer can war against the Constitution without violating his
undertaking to support it,"". and concluded that "the constitutional rights of
children not to be discriminated against . . . [and] can neither be nullified
openly and directly by state legislators or state executive or judicial
officers.""' President Eisenhower, who deployed the National Guard to
enforce the Court's decision, did not display Jackson's hostility to the Court."'
110. Id.
111. Because of the illegitimacy of the process, many Cherokees had boycotted the vote.
See REMINI, DEMOCRACY, supra note 78, at 299,
112. See O'BRIEN, supra note 109, at 233 ("The split in the Cherokee political leadership
caused a bitter power struggle.... [Flederal negotiators moved quickly to exploit the rift.").
113. THOMAS HART BENTON, ABRIDGMENT OF THE DEBATES OF CONGRESS, FROM 1789 TO
1856, at 19 (1857).
114. 358 U.S. 1 (1958).
115. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
116. Cooper, 358 U.S. at 18.
117. Id. at 17. See generally TONY A. FREYER, LITTLE ROCK ON TRIAL: COOPER v. AARON
AND SCHOOL DESEGREGATION (2007); Daniel A. Farber, The Supreme Court and the Rule of
Law: Cooper v. Aaron Revisited, 1982 U. ILL. L. REV. 387.
118. See Breyer, supra note 46, at 10 ("At that point, President Eisenhower said, 'I will send
troops to Arkansas - the paratroopers - but they will not go to thwart the law, they will go to
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Nonetheless, change, and enforcement of the Court's decision (as seen in
Brown), required an enforcement opinion. Yet the Court took only the first
step in Worcester, eschewing enforcement,"' and providing tacit consent for
removal.
The Court pursued this course of action notwithstanding obvious warning
signs: Georgia's boycott of oral arguments, a ten-month delay in Worcester's
release, and the well-known possibility that the opinion might be ignored.120
The Court, likely intentionally, preserved the precedent, but allowed Georgia
to continue removal.12 1 Why did the Court not pursue the case or enforce the
decision? Likely, for practical and political reasons. Practically, doing so
could have required the Court to expand its docket and hear a flood of Indian
cases. 122 Issuing an order required a unanimous vote from the Court, and
corralling the justices' votes may have been difficult. 123 The Georgia state
court strategically chose not to respond to the decision in writing; lacking a
lower court ruling to reverse complicated the Court's task of issuing a remedial
order.124
The Court was also hesitant to delve into political questions.12 s Opposing
public opinionl 26 and a popular president representing American views (e.g.,
expansionism and manifest destiny) could be highly unpopular. 127
enforce the law.' And those paratroopers went to Arkansas, they took the black children by the
hand, and they marched with those black children into the white school. That is progress.").
119. Magliocca, supra note 15, at 544 ("Simply put, the Court did not have to worry about
enforcing its decision because it adjourned almost immediately after Worcester was handed
down. Prior to adjourning, the Court issued its mandate reversing the judgment and ordered the
state court to release the missionaries.").
120. See id. at 545 ("But if the state court refused to obey, then the Court could upon
application order federal marshals to free the missionaries.").
121. See generally Clifford Lytle, The Supreme Court, Tribal Sovereignty, and Continuing
Problems of State Encroachment into Indian Country, 8 AM. INDIAN L. REv. 65, 69 (1980).
122. See Magliocca, supra note 15, at 532.
123. See generally Burke, supra note 8, at 526-27.
124. Miles, supra note 8, at 528.
125. The opinion in Cherokee Nation v. Georgia stated that the Tribes' status "savours too
much of the exercise of political power to be within the proper province of the judicial
department." 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 20 (1831).
126. See GARRISON, supra note 45, at 240 ("[T]he majority view of American lawyers and
legislators and, indeed, the white American public . . . was that the tribes were not sovereign
nations. Worcester, in sum, though a decision that represented judicial courage and clarity, was
a revolution with few adherents.").
127. Mark S. Hurwitz et al., The Influence of Public Opinion on Supreme Court Decision
Making, Revisited, Prepared for Delivery at the 2004 Annual Meeting of the American Political
Science Association 2 (Sept. 2004) ("[Tlhe proposition that Supreme Court decisions largely
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Scholars have suggested that Marshall anticipated that the Worcester
opinion might be ignored and authored it as a political attack on Indian
removal, rather than as an answer to the questions presented.,28 The opinion
could serve a political purpose, raising Indian removal as an election issue,
while ignoring the consequences for the Cherokee Nation if the opinion were
unenforced.'2 9 And finally, less than thirty years after Marbury v. Madison, "0
perhaps Marshall and his colleagues were nervous that if enforcement efforts
were unsuccessful, it would cause institutional damage to the Court."'
Regardless of the reasoning, the Court issued an opinion, and then
abandoned the case. Justice Story captured the Court's sentiments, saying,
"Thanks be to God, the Court can wash their hands clean of the iniquity of
oppressing the Indians and disregarding their rights."" 2 Neither the Court, nor
any government branch, should look for opportunities to avoid the duty to
protect the rule of law. Yet, it appears the Court did so, notwithstanding that
the Court had the means to do more. The Court could have instructed that the
orders issued to Georgia - which mandated Worcester's and Butler's release
and directed the Georgia court to reverse its decision - be delivered to the
follow public opinion has been widely embraced."); JEFFREY SEGAL& HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE
SUPREME COURT AND THE ATTrrUDINAL MODEL REVISITED 424 (2002) ("Supreme Court
decisions by and large correspond with public opinion.").
128. See Magliocca, supra note 15, at 537 ("Thus, the target of Worcester was not the State
of Georgia; it was Jackson's removal policy."). Those who support this view note that the
twenty-eight page opinion does not discuss Worcester until the second to last page. Burke,
supra note 8, at 523 ("His 28 page decision did not reach Worcester and his predicament until
the next-to-last page.").
129. See Magliocca, supra note 15, at 545 ("Worcester v. Georgia was one of the most
partisan opinions ever issued by the Court. It was all about rallying voters against Jacksonian
Democracy.").
130. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). In Marbury, the Court established the doctrine of
judicial review, and, as in Worcester, avoided conflict with the executive, presumably avoiding
a risk of institutional damage while still asserting authority. See STEPHEN J. ROCKWELL, INDIAN
AFFAIRS AND THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY 143-44 (2010) ("As
he had done in Marbury v. Madison, Marshall walked a fine line in the Indian cases that
protected the Court's independence and authority while avoiding conflict with the more
dynamic force of the executive. . . . In short, Marshall, as usual, stood firmly for national
supremacy but refused to put the Court into a head-to-head fight with the executive branch.").
131. See Magliocca, supra note 15, at 546 ("Consequently, the Court could hide behind
legalisms and avoid the institutional damage that would surely result from a futile effort to
enforce its order.").
132. 2 CHARLES WARREN, THE SUPREME COURT IN UNITED STATES HISTORY 757 (2d ed.
1926).
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court by a federal marshal.133 If Georgia failed to act and the lower court
continued to avoid signing a decision, the Court could have issued another
order. 13 4 In the coming years, the Court could have issued further opinions
requiring that white settlers be expelled from Cherokee lands - well within the
purview of the Court after passage of the Force Act of 1833."' The Court
could have monitored lower courts instead of washing its hands of the case and
permitting southern state courts to sidestep Worcester and continue to ignore
tribal sovereignty.131
William Wirt pointed out that "[i]n a land of laws, the presumption is that
the decision of courts will be respected; and, in case they should not, it is a
poor government indeed, in which there does not exist power to enforce
respect."1'3  Citizens, and in this case the Cherokee Nation, ought to be
confident that in a land of laws, the President will respect and enforce the
Court's opinions, the Senate will negotiate in good faith, and the Court will
monitor lower court and state actions, and, when necessary, issue remedial
orders to enforce the law. In Worcester, this was not the case. Failures in the
balance of power undermine the confidence we place in government and the
rule of law. As Samuel Worcester explained,
Who will hereafter venture to place any reliance on the Supreme
Court of the United States for protection against laws however
unconstitutional .. . if we now yield through fear that the decision
of the court will not and cannot be executed?"'
133. Wirt recommended Worcester take these steps, though he felt the Court would be
unable to do so. See Burke, supra note 8, at 524-26.
134. See Miles, supra note 8, at 528 ("President Jackson could not be called upon directly
to enforce the decision until after a final order had been issued by the Supreme Court at its
January 1833 term."). See generally Burke, supra note 8, at 525-27 ("[T]he required second
decree would go to the federal marshal, who was authorized by the Militia Act of 1795 to
enforce the orders of the Court.").
135. Force Act of Mar. 2, 1833, ch. 57, § 3,4 Stat. 632,633-34 (authorizing Supreme Court
Justices to issue writs of habeas corpus to state courts).
136. See GARRISON, supra note 45, 238-39 ("In the years between Worcester and the
removal of the Cherokees in 1838, dozens of Indians in the Southeast were arrested, convicted,
and imprisoned by the state courts. In 1834 ... Georgia hanged another Cherokee to prevent
him from appealing his murder conviction to the United States Supreme Court. Every one of
those arrests and convictions was a repudiation of Worcester.").
137. See KENNEDY, supra note 55, at 336.
138. See Miles, supra note 8, at 532.
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